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Abstract:  We examine a classic ‘wheel of retailing’ episode – the abandonment of the five 
and dime pricing formula by American variety chains. These switched from a conventional 
product lifecycle, focusing on cost reduction through standardisation, to a reverse path up the 
‘service cost - unit value’ continuum. We show that, rather than reflecting deteriorating 
managerial acumen, this was a response to the continued imperative for growth following 
retail format saturation. Firm-specific (rather than format-specific) competitive advantages 
were too weak for any chain to be confident it could win a within-format price war, making 
inter-format competition through raising price points more attractive. 
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Introduction 
For more than half a century the ‘wheel of retailing’ hypothesis has featured 
prominently in work on long-term retail change. This argues that new retail modes frequently 
emerge at the bottom end of the price and service spectrum, using low-cost, low margin, `no-
frills’ formats to undercut incumbent competitors. However, once well-established, such 
retailers typically up-grade services and facilities, thus raising costs and prices and leaving 
themselves vulnerable to a new wave of low-cost entrants.  
 The wheel of retailing is more properly characterised as a hypothesis than a theory. It 
was first proposed by Malcolm McNair (who undertook extensive research on chain and 
department store retailers) as early as 1931, though it was not until he re-stated and 
elaborated the model in 1958 that it began to attract widespread attention.
i
 McNair suggested 
that new types of retailer usually enter the market with an innovation that reduces operating 
costs, thus enabling them to cut margins. However, over time they up-grade their business 
models, with consequent increases in expense ratios. This process culminates in their entering 
a ‘mature’ phase as higher-cost, higher-service retailers, creating space for new retail formats 
to emerge at the bottom of the market. The enduring appeal of this ‘theory’ is that it describes 
a frequently (though not universally) observed phenomenon in retail change.
ii
 Formats said to 
be characterised by this process include variety and other chain stores, supermarkets, discount 
stores, catalogue showrooms, warehouse clubs, home-shopping networks, and on-line 
auctions.
iii
 
 Conversely, critics have highlighted the lack of any obvious motive for retailers to 
abandon a profitable business niche in favour of higher-price markets, where they would 
typically face greater competition from established retail formats. A review of early studies 
by Stanley Hollander identified various explanations, including the deterioration of 
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managerial acumen and development of a lax attitude towards cost control as retailers acquire 
status and wealth (the explanation proposed by McNair); market imperfections  -such as 
resale price maintenance, restrictive trade associations, and an aversion to price wars  - 
leading to growing emphasis on non-price competition through services; and improvements 
in living standards which transform an initially large `no frills’ retail segment into a 
progressively smaller one (but still attractive to new entrants).
iv
 Stephen Brown, writing over 
30 years later, noted very few additions to Hollander’s inventory of proposed causes.v One of 
the most interesting further contributions was to conceptualise the wheel process as a 
lifecycle phenomenon, akin to the product lifecycle. However the maturity phase was still 
explained in terms of the dissipation of managerial vitality, or the extension of the business 
beyond the capabilities of its managerial team.
vi
   
The wheel model still lacks any over-riding explanatory framework and has thus been 
portrayed as deterministic; inflexible; pattern- rather than process-orientated; and treating 
management as essentially powerless in moderating this process.
vii
 It has also been criticised 
for ignoring “system changes”; focusing on institutions in isolation from changes in 
consumption patterns, government policy, and other environmental factors, or the critical 
innovations that mark each new retail era.
viii
 
We examine a classic example of the wheel phenomenon, the abandonment of the five 
and dime format by American variety stores. Five and dime chains experienced very rapid 
growth over the four decades to the end of the First World War. However, by the 1920s most 
had overridden their 10c price limits (with the notable exception of Woolworths) and by the 
late 1930s virtually all had raised their price limits to a dollar or more, or had no price limit. 
We ask the questions: “what drove the five and dime chains to abandon their low price 
limits?” and “what were the impacts of this move to higher prices limits on net profit margins 
and overall corporate performance?”  
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Most classic explanations of the wheel phenomenon can be easily dismissed for the 
variety store sector. Five and dime chains had a vigorous profit-driven management 
remuneration and promotion culture, making them unlikely candidates for managerial inertia 
or a lax attitude towards costs. Resale price maintenance was also unimportant in this sector – 
as retailers sought to take control over their supply chains wherever possible – often dictating 
product specifications, and sometimes even production methods, to manufacturers.
ix
 
Furthermore, rather than facing declining consumer demand, low price ceiling variety stores 
are shown not only to have remained viable in the 1930s, but to have consistently produced 
larger profit margins than those chains which adopted higher limits.  
We explore the factors that drove five and dime stores to move to higher price points, 
together with the consequences of this policy change, using qualitative sources, including the 
archives of the two largest chains - Woolworths and S.S. Kresge. We outline the key features 
of their original business model; the factors that initiated the trend towards higher price 
points; and how this changed their business model and differentiating advantage compared to 
other retailers. Our analysis indicates that this process was driven primarily by retail format 
saturation. Five and dime chains enjoyed strong inter-format competitive advantages, 
undercutting established retailers on price. However, they had weak intra-format competitive 
advantages over rival dime chains and generally avoided head-on within-format competition 
at the point of sale, as this risked ruinous price wars. Thus, following the onset of format 
saturation, they preferred extending their merchandise range into higher value goods, in 
competition with other retail formats. However, by doing so they both took on some of the 
additional costs of these retail formats and reduced their cost advantage in their traditional 
lines. 
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On the basis of this analysis we develop a conceptual model, which predicts that the 
transition to higher price points will compress variety chains’ spread between gross and net 
margins and, therefore, profit rates. Dollar profit growth may still be substantial (though 
below that before retail format saturation), but only if firms are able to meet the new 
managerial challenges associated with their wider merchandise range and thereby achieve 
substantial sales growth. These hypotheses are then tested using published and archival data 
from the Harvard Bureau of Business Research (HBBR) variety chain surveys. 
 
The rise of the five and dime format 
The five and dime store is said to have been inspired by a drummer for the New York 
jobbers Spellman who, in around 1877, successfully launched a ‘5c counter’ in a Michigan 
store.
x
 F.W. Woolworth’s employer, Moore & Smith, copied this format from September 
1878. Later corporate histories claim that Woolworth was put in charge of the counter, 
though a first-hand account by Woolworth merely states that he was ‘watching this counter 
very carefully’.xi Woolworth also noted that by January 1879, when he approached Mr Moore 
with the proposition that he should open a 5c store, these were already being successfully 
developed in New York state. Thus Woolworth was an early pioneer of the five and dime 
format, but not the originator.
xii
 
 Woolworth developed the classic five and dime retail model, selling a wide selection 
of merchandise at low, fixed, clearly-marked prices, in large open stores, where customers 
were free to browse. Profit was based on sales volumes rather than high margins, store 
managers were paid by results, and business was conducted on a cash-only basis.
xiii
 
Woolworths eschewed press advertising, relying on price appeal, strong retail branding 
(including extensive window display), and word of mouth advertising - a strategy boosted by 
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locating stores on prime sites, with large numbers of passing customers.
xiv
 This was also 
necessitated by the character of their merchandise, as people were rarely prepared to make a 
special journey to buy five and dime goods.
xv
 
By the turn of the century a number of other major variety store chains had emerged, 
generally founded by ‘old-stock’ protestants from rural areas and small towns in the north 
eastern United States.
xvi
 For example, Sebastian Spering Kresge, founder of America’s 
second-largest five and dime chain, was a hardware salesman of Pennsylvania Dutch 
heritage.
xvii
 In the course of this work be became personally acquainted with F.W. Woolworth 
and another five and dime pioneer, J.G. McCrory (for whom he managed a store in Memphis 
Tennessee, owning a half interest, as well as a half interest in a store opened in Detroit in 
1899). Later that year he parted company with McCrory, taking full ownership in the Detroit 
store in exchange for his half share of the Memphis store.
xviii
 
Woolworths believed that under their sales formula goods sold themselves, the sales 
clerks’ duties being limited to wrapping purchases, making change, and keeping counters 
orderly stocked and price tagged. As a result they generally employed young girls, living with 
their parents, who were paid relatively low wages. In his annual letter of 1892 Woolworth 
noted that, `We must have cheap help or we cannot sell cheap goods. When a sales clerk gets 
so good she can get better wages elsewhere, let her go – for it does not require skilled and 
experienced salesladies to sell our goods.’xix His views had moderated slightly by 1899, 
acknowledging that there might be a case for paying slightly more to retain good staff.
xx
 Yet 
even in 1933 the average age of Woolworths’ sales girls was only 21 and their duties had 
changed little.
xxi
 
While the sales clerk’s job was simpler than in most stores, the manager’s task was 
more challenging.
xxii
 In addition to the usual store management tasks (some of which, such as 
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deterring shop-lifting, were accentuated by open display), they needed to ensure that only the 
fastest-selling lines for their local markets were stocked, as rapid stock-turn was crucial to 
operating profitably at low price points. Higher managerial positions placed an even greater 
premium on high quality recruits. The onus on rapid stock-turn involved heavy reliance on 
successful buyers, whose skill and effort played an important role in the overall success of the 
chain.
xxiii
  Coordinating the operations of their mushrooming branch networks and optimising 
chain stock-turn also entailed significant management skill - to collate and interpret the mass 
of data flowing from the stores to divisional and head office. For example, when Charlie 
Griswold became Woolworths’ General Manager in 1915, he felt it necessary to divide each 
store into 32 merchandise departments, with weekly and sometimes daily reports required for 
each.
xxiv
 
Successful managerial recruitment and incentivisation proved a key challenge for the 
five and dime chains.
xxv
 Woolworths again pioneered the general variety store model, based 
on profit sharing, meritocratic promotion, and internal labour markets. Their ‘pyramid of 
promotion’ system required all executives to start in the stock room as trainees. Promotion 
was then by merit, to more senior positions within the store, then to management of 
progressively larger stores, and, potentially, to the tiers of territorial and finally head office 
management.
 
 Promotion was based on both business success and conforming to a detailed 
code of behaviour designed to temper opportunism (prohibiting gambling, financial 
speculation, or gifts from suppliers) and maintain the store’s respectable image. Other variety 
stores sought broadly similar qualities in mangers, though Kresge, Grant, and McCrory 
placed greater emphasis on trainees having a good education.
xxvi
 
Woolworth store managers each received a percentage of their store’s annual profit, 
plus a drawing account of $10 a week, deducted from this commission.
xxvii
 Higher managers 
participated in a share of the profits for their relevant units and, in the case of the most senior, 
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of the entire concern. Five and dime chains also sought to foster a strong corporate culture, 
via frequent letters from headquarters, visits by supervisors (and, occasionally, more senior 
staff), and managers’ conventions.xxviii Variety store executives were well rewarded. Store 
managers were sometimes the most highly-paid salary men in small communities, while 
those few fortunate enough to reach the top of the largest chains might become 
millionaires.
xxix
 
Woolworths and the other early chains evolved broadly similar buying policies, based 
on direct purchasers from suppliers, who were persuaded to accept lower prices in return for 
bulk orders. New products were typically tested at a number of stores and then made 
generally available, orders being based on simple optimisation rules of achieving target sales 
per counter foot. Both individual lines and certain colours or sizes within those lines that did 
not make the target were ruthlessly discarded. These systems collectively provided major 
savings in inventory management. The weekly “checking list” system provided a perpetual 
inventory of stock, while sales per foot of counter-space rules removed problems of slow 
selling items. Direct purchases cut out the extra transport, loading, storage, order processing, 
and shrinkage costs of wholesaler supply. Moreover this allowed greater control over stock 
quality and lowered manufacturer’s inventory costs by providing a more stable stream of 
orders.
xxx
 The development of motor transport enabled variety chains to expand direct to store 
delivery, thus reducing warehousing costs. The 1935 HBBR survey found that typical variety 
chains had more than 90 per cent of merchandise passing direct from the manufacturer to the 
individual stores.
xxxi
 This was more expensive for stores distant from the main production 
centres. Woolworths – the only variety chain operating in all U.S. states – addressed this by 
having a higher, 15c, price ceiling for stores west of the Missouri or in Canada (where they 
also faced higher taxes) and by developing regional warehouses in New York, San Francisco, 
and Toronto.
xxxii
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Pressures for higher price points 
By 1914 Woolworths had 737 stores and sales of $69,619,669, its nearest competitors 
being S.S. Kresge (118 stores, $16,097,393 sales); S.H. Kress (118 stores; $11,897,989 
sales); J.G. McCrory (116 stores, $5,224,692 sales); and W.T. Grant (16 stores, £2,000,908 
sales).
xxxiii
 Grant was the most recent of what later became known as the ‘Big Five’ variety 
store chains, opening his first store in 1906, but becoming the third largest chain in terms of 
sales from 1930. Grant had identified a gap in the market for a variety chain offering 
merchandise above the dime store price ceiling, initially adopting a 25c price limit (which 
had already been introduced by Kress from 1901) and later pioneering the ‘to a dollar’ store 
format.
 xxxiv
 
 F.W. Woolworth was adamantly opposed to raising price ceilings. In a General Letter 
of October 1910 on the danger of drifting into higher price points, Woolworth recounted the 
rise of fixed-price ‘99c stores’ in the early 1870s, which were hugely successful for several 
years but subsequently declined after they adopted higher price limits.
xxxv
 However, ten cent 
price ceilings proved difficult to sustain given inflationary pressures during the First World 
War (retail prices rising by almost 80 per cent over 1914-19). Kresge raised the price limit for 
their red front stores to 15c in 1917 and, later in the same year, 25c. Then in 1920 the limit 
for their green front stores was raised from 50c to $1.
xxxvi
 Towards the end of the War some 
Woolworths directors pressed for higher price ceilings and were only persuaded otherwise by 
F.W. Woolworth threating to resign.
xxxvii
 Consequently Woolworths remained the only large 
U.S. variety chain with a 10c price limit by the 1920s.
xxxviii
  
 Despite a long-term trend of lower prices during the 1920s and 1930s, variety stores 
continued to raise their price ceilings; by 1927 most had a maximum price of $1 or more.
xxxix
 
The whole concept of price ceilings was also coming under pressure. By 1922 Kresge were 
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selling special millinery at up to $5 in their 25c - $1 stores, while their range of over-a-dollar 
merchandise subsequently expanded.
xl
  Changes in consumer purchasing patterns made 
higher price points attractive to the variety chains.  Real incomes rose over the 1920s, 
boosting a trend towards working-class purchases of women’s ready-to-wear clothing. Such 
clothing sold on a combination of fashion and price appeal, with even the department stores 
often introducing more price-orientated promotions.
xli
 The Depression era witnessed a further 
trend towards ‘price consciousness’ as a major influence on buying behaviour, suggesting 
that the variety chain business model might profitably be extended to a much broader range 
of goods than their traditional niche.
xlii
  
However, the major factor driving the trend towards higher price ceilings was that the 
five and dime store had reached the limits of market format saturation. The major variety 
chains had generally sought to avoid head-on competition. For example, despite operating 
some 238 U.S. stores, in 24 states plus Washington DC by the end of 1909 (prior to the 1911 
merger with five affiliated chains), Woolworths only faced direct competition at 52 locations, 
including Kresge at 18 points and McCrory at 10.
xliii
 Avoiding head-on competition was a 
conscious policy choice. For example, Samuel H. Kress, who opened his first store, in 
Memphis Tennessee, in 1896, chose to focus on the south because that region had no five and 
ten’s.xliv At an early stage he made a deal with Sebastian S. Kresge to avoid each other’s 
territories (said to be at least partly on account of potential customer confusion, given their 
similar names and signage). Subsequently, no Kress and Kresge stores ever appeared on the 
same main street.
xlv
 This strategy was facilitated by geographical segmentation of the major 
chains. Even Woolworths was only active in 37 states at the beginning of 1912. Yet by 1920 
there was no town of over 8,000 people in the USA without a Woolworths. For other variety 
chains, moving into towns above this size would therefore involve taking on Woolworths 
head-on or outflanking them with a broader range of merchandise.
xlvi
 By the late 1920s 
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grocery chains also faced format saturation, further expansion entailing invading one 
another’s territories and thus competing their margins away - a strategy described by one 
analyst as ‘suicidal’. xlvii 
Pressures to continue branch expansion subsequently led Woolworths to drop its 
minimum store size threshold, a policy Charles Phillips identified as a key factor behind 
Woolworths’ declining profitability trend, evident even prior to the Depression.xlviii Then, in 
1932, it finally followed the other variety chains in seeking sales growth through higher price 
limits. Merchandise priced at 20c was successfully tested in 77 stores from March of that year 
and generally adopted three months later. In November 1935 Woolworths’ board agreed to 
remove any fixed price limit, marking the end of the five and dime store era.
xlix
  
Chains responded to market saturation via two related strategies – both of which were 
assisted by extending their merchandise range into higher value goods. The first involved 
moving into smaller towns. Fifteen identical chains surveyed by HBBR over 1932-39 
increased their number of outlets in towns of under 10,000 population by 23.71 per cent 
during this period, compared to an increase in total store numbers of only 8.32 per cent.
l
 
Geographical expansion via smaller units raised aggregate sales, but at the cost of reducing 
average sales per store and, therefore, productivity.
li
 Extending the product range increased 
the size of store that any given population could sustain and also helped deter new 
competitors – who would be reluctant to invest resources in a small community, already 
catered for by a chain serving a broad range of their customers’ non-food needs (a strategy 
long pursued by the J.C. Penney “junior department store” chain).lii  
An alternative or complementary policy of growth through expanding existing stores, 
(again facilitated by extending the product range) offered greater scale economies, given that 
these were typically in larger communities). The G.C. Murphy chain rejected developing 
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smaller stores in favour of expanding existing stores and broadening their merchandise 
selection. This assisted them in achieving average sales per store in 1936 above those for 
Woolworth, Newberry, and McLellan and not far short of Grant, McCrory, and Kresge (all of 
which they were to overtake, on this measure, by 1940), despite a focus on relatively small 
towns. A key element of Murphy’s strategy was the use of higher price points to expand lines 
such as clothing, which became increasingly important to their overall business.  
Retail format saturation also limited the prospects of managerial recruits, a trend that, 
industry observers noted, might threaten the chains’ ability to attract the right calibre of 
trainee.
liii
 Kresge responded to the growing intervals between promotion slots becoming 
available by reducing the minimum age of new trainees from 21 to 18 from October 1935.
liv
 
More generally, variety chains were criticised for appointing conformists, with backgrounds, 
views, and personality traits socially acceptable to those in senior positions. They thus 
typically excluded ethnic minorities, women, and, to some extent ambitious people who 
sought faster promotion than their `pyramid’ system offered. The use of bureaucratic 
organisational systems to control the chains’ extensive branch networks was also said to raise 
staff motivation problems, by regimenting managers’ careers and restricting the scope for 
innovation.
lv
 Moreover, they faced management job market competition from new chains, 
especially the well-resourced store networks launched by Sears and Montgomery Ward, 
where rapid growth generated rapid promotion opportunities.
lvi
 However, such criticisms 
were relevant to most long-established American corporations and variety chains’ profit-
based remuneration systems still offered relatively good long-term prospects in a slack job 
market. 
Woolworths’ top executives also had to cope with expanding international operations 
outside mainland North America. Their first and largest subsidiary, in Britain and Ireland, 
proved highly successful and operated with considerable autonomy from the 1920s (its inter-
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war Executive Committee minutes show very little evidence of interventions by the U.S. 
parent).
lvii
 However, expansions into Cuba from 1925 and Germany, from 1927, proved more 
problematic. For example, restrictions on new German store development, from 1932, were 
intensified during the Nazi era, when they were also targeted both by boycotts, protests, and 
acts of violence against Woolworth stores (precipitated by them bowing to domestic public 
pressure not to stock German goods).
lviii
 However, Woolworths were the only variety chain to 
pursue this strategy and such problems were not unusual for American multinationals at this 
time. 
Impacts of higher price ceilings 
 Although variety stores fared the depression much better than the department stores 
with whom they were increasingly competing, they nevertheless witnessed a pronounced dip 
in profits. Fifteen identical variety chains analysed by HBBR saw their aggregate net 
operating profits fall from 5.93 per cent of net sales in 1929 to only 0.31 per cent in 1932 and 
an annual average of 3.88 per cent over 1933-1940.
lix
  The three largest, Woolworth, Kresge, 
and Kress, witnessed a fall in their collective market share of the top ten multiple chains from 
over 70 per cent in 1929 to just over 61 per cent in 1940.
lx
 Some fared much worse; in 1933 
both McCrory and McLellan (which had been the fifth and sixth largest variety chains 
respectively in 1929), fell into receivership, both being subsequently recapitalised under new 
managements.
lxi
  
Meanwhile the chains addressed the longer-term problem of developing 
merchandising policies appropriate to both their traditional and new lines. As the 1936 HBBR 
variety chain survey noted, `The very nature of the limited price variety chain business makes 
it inevitable that price policies are also merchandise policies.’lxii At least some chains 
recognised that higher-priced lines might impact on their brand image and selling methods in 
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ways detrimental to five and dime trade. Kresge initially dealt with this by opening a second 
chain of ‘Green Front’ stores in 1920, with goods priced from 25c to $1, in addition to their 
‘Red Front’ nickel and dime stores.lxiii These parallel chains (often located side by side) were 
controlled jointly from their Detroit head office and came under the same real estate 
management. However, they had different sets of buyers and personnel managers, reflecting 
their different labor and merchandise requirements.
lxiv
 Murphy’s introduction of a dollar price 
limit in around 1923 was accompanied by a vertical, rather than horizontal, outlet 
segmentation strategy, with their 25c - $1 and 5 & 10c lines being split between separate 
floors of the same buildings.  Each floor had its own staff, store number, and external 
signage, to prevent damage to Murphy’s brand image as a five and dime retailer. However, 
this policy entailed splitting related items in the same product class, a problem that led to the 
integration of all their stores by 1928.
lxv
 
Kresge’s difficulties during the depression (accentuated by a strong presence in large 
auto, steel, and other heavy industry towns) eventually forced it to also abandon a two chain 
policy. Kresge’s “Green Front” stores were particularly hard-hit, as depression intensified 
competition with department and speciality stores. Their share price fell from $57.50 to a low 
of $5.50 and Kresge responded by broadening its stock, their Green Front stores raising their 
price ceiling to $3.
lxvi
 Then, during the mid-1930s, they began combining the Green and Red 
Fronts into “combination” stores. In 1940 the buying divisions for the two store groups were 
also integrated.
lxvii
 
The down-side of this policy was that five and dime lines could not operate efficiently 
alongside higher value merchandise. Traditional variety store goods came to be seen as loss-
leaders to pull in customers, rather than important earners in their own right.  For example, in 
February 1932 Kresge conducted an audit of their 25c to $1.00 stores, examining goods at 
each price point in terms of their contribution to selling floorspace, individual transactions, 
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and total sales revenue. While only 20 per cent of customers bought items priced above 50c 
in January 1932, these accounted for 43 per cent of sales revenue, while taking up only 38 per 
cent of counter space. Conversely, `up to 25c’ merchandise took up 37 per cent of floorspace 
and accounted for 60 per cent of individual transactions, but only 32 per cent of revenue. A 
clear trend towards a lower average sale than in the previous January was identified, with 80 
per cent of customers buying merchandise priced at 50c or less. Yet, rather than wishing to 
further boost sales in this price range, staff were urged, ‘to realize the importance of 
increasing the number of sales on higher priced items. The customers have shown that they 
favour low prices, and we propose to feature and show low prices to get them into the store, 
but we can increase the number of sales on higher priced items by sale suggestion and good 
salesmanship.’lxviii 
The memorandum went on to note that, ‘Right now we have a great many outstanding 
$1 items, but with Department Stores and direct competitors playing up low prices, we cannot 
feature the $1 price. Our opportunity lies in bringing customers into the store with low priced 
items and then showing and selling higher priced merchandise’.lxix In other words, Kresge 
were advocating a strategy similar to that employed by many down-market department stores. 
Higher price limits opened up a much larger, but increasingly crowded, market. 
Competitors included department stores, expanding speciality chains in menswear, women’s 
apparel, millinery, footwear, and hosiery, and drug stores (that were also extending their 
merchandise range).
lxx
 Nevertheless, variety chains preferred taking on such competition 
(where they enjoyed some cost advantage over established retailers, who typically had 
grander premises and more elaborate services), to head-on battles against other variety stores 
that would principally involve bidding down each other’s margins. Moreover, given that 
much consumer expenditure occurred at prices over 25c, this market appeared to offer greater 
prospects for long-term growth. Indeed this strategy proved successful in increasing variety 
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stores’ share of general merchandise trade from 14.03 per cent in 1929 to 17.24 per cent in 
1939, as shown in Table 1. This was achieved at the cost of a much larger proportional rise in 
the number of retail units – mainly owing to the expansion into smaller communities, 
discussed earlier. Ominously, as the tables shows, a 22.08 per cent increase in real variety 
store sales over this period occurred at the cost of a 44.33 per cent rise in pay-roll expenses 
and a 32.59 per cent rise in their number of employees; implying negative labour 
productivity.  
[Table 1 near here] 
Competition in the over 25c market proved more difficult than the variety stores had 
anticipated. Even the department stores, which had the highest advertising and service costs 
of any large-scale retail format, managed to increase their share of total retail sales slightly 
above 1929 levels during the mid and late 1930s. Given their high sunk costs of expensive 
premises and accumulated good-will, most remained in operation even if they failed to cover 
total costs, while some were prepared to hold on even when revenue did not meet variable 
costs, in the hope of a return to better times. Department stores collectively generated a 
positive operating profit for only three years over 1930-39, yet they increased their market 
share through sale promotions and aggressive price competition to boost turnover and thus 
offset heavy fixed costs, even where this entailed unattractive margins.
lxxi
 
As many new lines, such as light women’s clothing, had a significant fashion element, 
the variety stores began to encounter some of the merchandising problems of department 
stores. Style goods typically had high original mark-ups, high selling expenses, and high 
mark downs if not sold quickly.
lxxii
 This created much greater problems of inventory control 
than for traditional five and dime merchandise, which mainly constituted staple household 
items with slow fashion cycles.
lxxiii
 Fashion goods also required more intensive promotion, 
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leading the high price-limit chains to adopt some of the promotional practices of the 
department stores, such as advertising and cut-price sales events.
lxxiv
 By the late 1930s Grant 
launched big sales two or three times a year, supported by full-page ads, heavy with 
prices.
lxxv
   
Moreover, fashion merchandise required elements of the skilled, personal, selling 
approach that had traditionally sharply demarcated the department and variety store business 
models.  By 1932 Kresge were strongly advocating a policy of pushing high gross margin 
items (compared to the average for each department) in their dollar stores, using `suggestive 
selling’.lxxvi These were indicated by placing `Red Stars’ on counters, so saleswomen knew 
which lines to push.
lxxvii
 Recommending complementary items required significant sales 
knowledge and training. As a 1935 note to managers argued:  
`Knowledge of merchandise… is the first essential to successful salesmanship. You 
should possess this information in order to properly train your salesgirls in the art of 
increasing each sale. Of equal importance is a thorough understanding of the best 
methods for presenting your merchandise to the customer in such a manner that 
interest is aroused and the salesgirls’ service appreciated... Verbal suggestions must 
be followed up by intelligent comment... Few salesgirls are instinctively able to do 
this. It is your duty to outline to them the various means of making suggestions 
effective... and training them to use the right approach for making each suggestion 
“strike home”.’lxxviii 
A further, June 1936, Kresge letter to stores noted that: `Whether or not we are 
realizing the most from this demand for style items depends to a considerable degree upon 
how well “style” minded our salesforce has become.’ lxxix Sales staff were expected to keep 
themselves informed regarding the latest styles by studying fashion magazines. Kresge stores 
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ran contests between groups of salesgirls to increase their enthusiasm for direct selling.
lxxx
 
G.C. Murphy was also urging its sales clerks to use `related item suggestion’, by 1929, 
assisted by systematic staff training.
lxxxi
 W.T. Grant preferred sales staff to physically show 
customers additional merchandise – ‘additional showing’.lxxxii 
Pushing high margin items via suggestive selling left variety chains vulnerable to 
opportunistic behaviour by store managers who – in an effort to boost their profit-based 
commission - raised margins to levels that negated their price advantage. This might raise 
profits for the individual store, but damaged the company’s overall reputation with both 
customers and suppliers. As an October 1936 Kresge note to stores warned: ‘Profiteering is 
an open invitation to every little store in town to step in and compete with and undersell 
Kresge’s... the truly efficient manager… can be glad he is not in the shoes of the profiteer 
when the truth is uncovered...’lxxxiii A 1935 investigation of 17 stores had revealed margins 
typically higher than those specified by head office. In one case a manager had requested to 
raise prices: 
 “to those of the independent hardware dealer, yet the items mentioned figured 41% 
gross. He wanted 54%... A manufacturer writes in that his item is being sold at a 
higher price than agreed on in all stores visited. What a reputation the Kresge 
organization has with this man, and the others that have the experience of seeing their 
merchandise being sold at a price where they know the most sales resistance 
lies!”lxxxiv 
However, evidence reviewed by Alan Raucher suggests that this problem arose from 
Kresge’s target-driven managerial culture. Store managers perceived that profit targets for 
bonuses and promotion could only be achieved through “profiteering”.lxxxv  
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In the 1936 HBBR survey, McNair highlighted the risks associated with the variety 
chains’ move up the retailing wheel. This entailed foregoing the strong promotional appeal of 
low fixed price limits and brought new managerial problems in buying, merchandising and 
sales promotion. Even if these challenges were overcome, he predicted a decline in gross 
margins – owing to the increased likelihood of mark-downs for fashion items and retaliatory 
price-cutting by established retailers. Firms might gain some reduction in selling costs, which 
were strongly linked to the number of transactions, though only if this was not offset by the 
costs of more active and knowledgeable salesmanship.
lxxxvi
 McNair predicted the most likely 
result would be a fall in net margins, increased profits thus being reliant on producing 
sufficient extra sales volume to more than compensate for this.
lxxxvii
 J.K. Winkler concluded 
his 1940 biography of F.W. Woolworth on a similar note, “The new prices bring Woolworth 
into keener competition with important department stores... Indeed, when entering the 
streamlined, chromiumed emporiums on fashionable metropolitan thoroughfares, the shopper 
may wonder whether he and his dime have not strayed into the wrong place.
 lxxxviii
 
 
A model of retail change – the service cost - unit value continuum 
The evidence reviewed above indicates that the retail lifecycle of variety chains (and, 
by extension, other low-price retail formats) is broadly inverse to the product life cycle 
(PLC). A key feature of the PLC model is that as markets mature, products become 
increasingly standardised, offering reductions in production costs for large firms, able to 
magnify the benefits of cost-reducing process innovations through economies of scale.
lxxxix
 
While the PLC hypothesis leads to a movement from complexity to cost reduction and 
standardisation, the opposite is the case under the wheel of retailing, where mature firms 
move from extreme standardisation of products and price points to increasingly complex 
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product categories – requiring a growing element of customer service. This in turn creates 
substantial managerial challenges, regarding growing product/service complexity, greater 
uncertainty (given their lack of knowledge of the new market and the likely competitive 
reaction of incumbents) and adverse impacts on established product lines. 
 Our model views shifts from low to higher value merchandise as being driven by 
retail format saturation in the low price niche. No frills retail formats compete primarily on 
price. However, for very low price merchandise substantial gross margins are necessary to 
cover high handling cost to price ratios. Price wars between rival stores adopting the same 
format are thus potentially ruinous. The alternative is to move into higher value lines, but this 
necessarily involves adding more services – to meet the minimum expectations of consumers 
and provide the information and advice they require. The relationship between price and 
services thus represents a continuum, as shown in Figure 1 (for inter-war retailers with a 
broad product mix of mainly non-food items). We use the HBBR classification of variety 
stores into three groups: Class A - price range 5c - 25c, low average sale; B - price up to $1, 
low average sale; and C - up to $1, high average sale.
xc
 The upper merchandise bounds of 
groups B and C increasingly overlapped with `junior department stores’ – small department 
stores selling a limited range of goods at relatively low prices – exemplified by J.C. Penney. 
They also increasingly competed with lower-end line specialised multiples, drug stores, and 
with the staple merchandise of down-market mainstream department stores. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
In practice, given their broad product selection, both unit prices and associated 
services varied substantially within each store. However, the classification is important, as it 
determines the level of human and physical capital required to sustain the format, with major 
implications for costs and price mark-ups. In terms of market segmentation, variety stores 
were strongly segmented by price and services, yet attracted customers across a broad social 
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spectrum. High grade department stores were strongly segmented by both price and the class 
of customer. Meanwhile retail formats in the middle of the spectrum served the largest 
markets –constituting a particularly attractive target for variety stores facing retail format 
saturation within their price class. 
Yet there are risks in up-grading products and associated services, as discussed in the 
broader literature on product range extension and corporate performance.
xci
 Change is a 
process that requires substantial managerial time and resources, making established 
capabilities less relevant and disrupting organisational routines.
xcii
 The literature predicts that 
firms which expand their product scope too dramatically may run into rigidities in existing 
resources and capabilities, hampering effective change due to imperfect learning and/or 
impediments on resource reconfiguration.
xciii
 Over-ambitious extensions of product/service 
offerings may also produce disproportionate increases in their cost base, even incurring losses 
in extreme cases.
xciv
 Moreover, firms sometimes lack the managerial capabilities or 
organizational structures necessary to efficiently absorb such changes without inefficient and 
costly adjustment and coordination problems.
xcv
 For example, variety stores faced extra costs 
in selling fashion-orientated goods alongside traditional lines, as the selling skills necessary 
for the fashion items were wasted on five and dime merchandise. The potential for cost 
inflation is also influenced by the changing nature and degree of competition as firms shift to 
higher market segments, as incumbents may have advantages in services provision (such as 
strong retail brand reputations, or embeddedness in local communities). 
Our model thus implies that moves up the unit cost – services continuum will be 
accompanied a reduction in the spread between gross margins and total expenses. Five and 
dime stores based their competitive advantage on reducing selling tasks to wraping 
merchandise and giving change, thus giving them a major cost advantage over other retailers 
who built a greater service element into the sales task. However, variety chains’ transition to 
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higher value goods involved embracing this more active and (for any given price point) more 
expensive form of selling, which raised selling costs even for their five and dime lines. Net 
margins would therefore be compressed to levels nearer to (though not necessarily as low as) 
those of retailers with a business model based on personal selling, such as department stores 
and line-specialised multiples. Impacts on total profit growth would be dependent on how 
successfully each chain responded to the potential problems associated with the broader 
merchandise range. However, even if they successfully negotiated these challenges profit 
growth is likely to slow, relative to their initial phase of growth, when they enjoyed relatively 
little local within-format competition and could substantially undercut the prices of 
established formats. The following section examines quantitative evidence regarding these 
predicted outcomes. 
 
Quantifying the profit implications of moving up the service cost - unit value continuum 
HBBR’s systematic compilation of variety chain cost and margin data enable us to 
analyse whether moving up the service cost – unit price continuum did indeed involve 
accepting lower profit rates. The first HBBR variety chain store survey, for 1931 (with a 
comparison for 1929), encompassed 33 chains operating some 2,565 stores. Conversely, the 
1932 survey covered 29 chains, but – following the inclusion of Woolworths - around twice 
as many stores, including practically all the large firms. From that date onward the surveys, 
conducted annually, were broadly representative of the sector. It was estimated that during 
the mid-late 1930s they captured over 90 per cent of total variety chain volume.
xcvi
 These 
included the Canadian stores of US variety chains, as well as several chains operating entirely 
in Canada.
xcvii
 The HBBR definition of a variety store was almost identical to that of the 
Census Bureau, only one large national chain included in the HBBR sample not being so 
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classified by the Census Bureau in 1933.
xcviii
 Most were local or regional chains. Of the 30 
chains reporting in 1934, only seven were ‘national’ in scope, though most of these were not 
represented in all states.
xcix
  
 Aggregate time-series data from the surveys show a declining trend of net profit (as 
well as the expected cyclical variation), but this evidence is not compelling in itself, given the 
changed retail environment of Depression and post-Depression America. A more useful 
approach is to examine the performance of variety stores with different pricing policies at the 
same points in time. Before examining this data it is useful to briefly summarise a number of 
other factors identified in the surveys as influencing the performance of variety chains. As 
might be expected, larger chains reaped managerial economies of scale for activities 
conducted centrally.
c
 Their greater purchasing power would also contribute to lower purchase 
prices, providing higher gross margins at each price point. Average store size was also 
identified as an important differentiator. Chains of small stores were found to suffer from 
lower stock-turn; higher proportional utility costs (reflecting lower sales per square foot and 
discounts sometimes offered for higher consumption); and both higher labour costs and lower 
labour productivity (as larger stores required fewer staff per square foot of selling space).
ci
 To 
reflect these additional factors data on these variables are included alongside average 
transaction values in Tables 2-4 and in the regression analysis summarised in Table 5. 
The surveys identified merchandising policy as a key differentiator of costs and 
margins. Stores which retained a 25c limit (with an average sale of 17.5 cents in 1935) were 
found to have markedly higher gross margins than ‘to a dollar’ stores, reflecting higher 
handling cost to price ratios for low unit value merchandise, together with lower rates of 
mark-downs and shortages.
cii 
To a dollar stores had much higher proportionate apparel and 
accessories sales (which were particularly prone to mark-downs and shortages, in common 
with other fashion-related goods). These accounted for only 7.49 per cent of sales for stores 
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with price limits of 25c or less in 1933, but 31.75 per cent of sales for dollar stores with a low 
average sale and 44.94 per cent for dollar stores with a high average sale.
ciii
 However, HBBR 
found that differences in the performance of variety chains could not be explained simply in 
terms of variations in the proportion of apparel and accessory merchandise, which 
traditionally had higher price mark-ups than goods of equivalent value, to compensate for 
mark-downs and `shortage’ losses.civ Pricing policies appear to have a broader impact, not 
confined to any particular class of merchandise. 
 Cross-sectional aggregate data from the surveys suggest that 5-25c stores had 
significantly higher net profit rates than variety stores with higher price limits. Table 2 shows 
operating results over 1933-35, for 5-25c stores and $1 (or more) stores, the latter being 
disaggregated into stores with low and high average sales. In addition to higher gross 
margins, stores with lower price points or average sales were found to have higher pay-roll 
costs (both reflecting the higher relative handling costs of small transactions). Tenancy costs 
were also higher; possibly due to the fact that five and dime stores required prime sites and 
passing trade, whereas people were prepared to go out of their way for higher-value 
purchases.  
 [Table 2 near here] 
Overall, despite lower costs in areas such as advertising, 25c stores were found to 
have slightly higher expenses ratios than $1 stores, while low average sale dollar stores had 
higher expenses than high average sale dollar stores. Yet lower expenses ratios were 
insufficient to offset the lower margins on higher ticket goods, resulting in markedly lower 
trading profits, and total net gain as a proportion of net sales, for stores with higher average 
unit prices.
cv
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 While the table suggests that stores with higher price limits and average sales had 
lower net margins, such aggregate data still do not provide conclusive evidence. 5-25c stores 
differed significantly from their higher-price counterparts in terms of average sales per firm 
and per store – two factors which the surveys showed to have important impacts on 
profitability. To disentangle the influence of average sale, firm size, and store size, analysis is 
necessary at the level of the individual firm. While no original returns to these surveys have 
survived, the HBBR archives, at Harvard's Baker Library, include worksheets providing 
some firm-level data for 1929 and 1931-34. Table 3 shows available data for all national 
chains for 1933 and 1934 (other than McCrory and McLellan, for which no usable data are 
available, presumably owing to the fact that they were in receivership). The table shows a 
tendency for chains with higher price limits and average transaction values to have lower net 
margins. However, as predicted, this is driven by total expenses being higher relative to gross 
margins. This compression of net margins for firms with higher unit value merchandise is 
corroborated by longer-term (1929-38) data on net income to sales ratios.
cvi
 
[Table 3 near here] 
 W.T. Grant (the only chain shown with a high price limit and high average sale 
policy) had a lower gross margin than the others, which was not compensated for by its 
expense ratio, thus producing the lowest net margin among the five chains. However, in 
terms of aggregate profits growth, it was more successful than its 25c price limit competitors 
– as this margin was combined with a 20 per cent increase in dollar sales over 1929-33, while 
Woolworths, Kresge, and Kress had all experienced falling sales. G.C. Murphy (essentially a 
large regional chain) also had a higher price limit policy than Woolworths, Kresge, or Kress, 
but with a lower average sale than Grant. Murphy’s achievement of both a respectable net 
margin and rapid growth reflected its strong focus on small towns with no department or 
variety stores (as reflected in its low average sales per store). In these it developed a 
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profitable local niche spanning both variety and department store lines, in a similar manner to 
J.C. Penney.  
 Grant’s success at applying the variety store formula to high ticket lines (many with a 
considerable fashion element) required a high stock turn  - to avoid heavy mark-downs. The 
risks associated with dependence on rapid stock turn of fashion goods are illustrated by the 
example of McLellan, America’s sixth largest variety store chain in 1929. Their high unit 
price policy provided a 1932 gross margin of only 26.86 per cent, some 7.04 percentage 
points below their total expenses, forcing it into receivership.  
McNair’s concerns regarding the risks of lower gross margins leading to declining 
(and potentially negative) net profits in the absence of sufficient extra sales volume thus 
appear well-founded. However, we also need to control for firm-level purchasing and 
administrative scale economies from high aggregate sales, and for store-level technical scale 
economies, proxied by average sales per store. HBBR archival data sheets enable us to do so 
for 16 chains, the descriptive statistics for which are shown in Table 4. These are classified 
into HBBR’s three price ranges – Class A  (5c to 25c price range, low average transaction 
value); Class B (dollar price limit, low average transaction); Class C (dollar price limit, high 
average transaction). 
[Tables 4 and 5 near here] 
Table 5 provides ordinary least squares estimates of firm net margins for this 
sample.
cvii
 In specification 1 the price bands are analysed using the lowest price band, Class 
A, as the reference group. The results indicate that - relative to this class - there are lower net 
margins, of 6.0% and 6.8% respectively, for Classes B and C. Our findings thus suggest that 
moving to dollar price ceilings did indeed sacrifice net margin for growth; and, therefore, 
headline profits. These results are sustained, albeit with higher coefficients, when we 
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incorporate payroll expenditure in specification 2. In specification 3 we also control for firm-
level economies, through total sales volumes, and store-level economies - via average sales 
per store (factors shown in Tables 3 and 4 to vary significantly between firms). We find that 
net margins are positively associated with net sales per store, suggesting that technical scale 
economies are important. However, we do not find that total sales volumes are important - 
though this may reflect our relatively small sample and the fact that we are already capturing 
firm-specific fixed-effects.  
The regression results thus provide strong support for our hypothesis that moving to 
higher price limits and average transaction values was associated with a substantial decline in 
net margins and net income to sales ratios, a result corroborated by our analysis of financial 
data for the largest individual chains. Impacts on sales growth are found to be very variable 
between firms – though for every major chain growth was markedly slower than during the 
dime store era.
cviii
 Firms that successfully managed the change process nevertheless achieved 
significant growth during the 1930s, while others that failed to do so, such as McLellan, 
could face losses and potential liquidation. 
 
Conclusions 
 Our findings support McNair’s original conception of the wheel of retailing as a 
process – characterised by low cost retailers eventually finding it necessary to upgrade their 
business models, thereby reducing the spread between their gross and net margins and thus 
creating space for new retail formats to emerge at the bottom of the market. However, they do 
not support his more tentative conclusion that this was the result of declining managerial 
acumen.
cix
 Instead our study identifies the wheel process as a phenomenon of retail format 
saturation, at a time when there was no obvious new business model that might enable 
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innovative variety chains to under-cut their competitors (analogous to the supermarket 
format, which enabled some grocery chains to reinforce their price advantage during the 
1930s).
cx
 Variety chains faced an imperative for continued growth, to meet the expectations 
of both shareholders and of executives whose incomes and promotion prospects were 
strongly dependent on expanding the promotion pyramid.
cxi
 Perceiving that within-format 
competition at the point of sale would be mutually destructive (given their essentially similar 
systems, and reliance of substantial gross margins, given high handling cost to price ratios), 
they instead chose to move into higher priced merchandise.  
 This up-grading strategy could be successful, as shown by the examples of Grant and 
Murphy. Even these firms experienced a marked reduction in net profit rates, but this is 
hardly surprising given that they moved from a position of clear price advantage (assuming 
no within-format competition at the point of sale) to one where their business model was less 
differentiated from that of service-orientated department stores and line-specialised chains. 
We conclude that, at least in this instance, the wheel phenomenon does not reflect a 
systematic deterioration of management across the format, or even a decline in performance 
(relative to market conditions) but a change in those conditions from a situation where their 
novel format provided an element of local monopoly to one where they were competitors in  
a crowded market. However, even where successful, up-grading inevitably left space at the 
bottom of the market for another turn of the wheel, by new retail formats at the start of their 
lifecycle. 
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Table 1: Variety store growth, employees, and labour costs - growth over time and 
comparison with other retailers, 1929-39 
 
Source: United States, Bureau of the Census, Seventeenth Census of the United States, 1940, Census of 
Business, Vol. 1, Retail Trade 1939, Part I (Washington, 1943), 16. 
Notes: 
a
 Department stores, variety stores, and dry goods & general merchandise stores; 
b
 1939=100, deflated 
using Bureau of Labour Statistics wholesale price index, Malcolm P. McNair and Eleanor G. May, “The 
American Department Store 1920-1960. A Performance Analysis based on the Harvard Reports,” Harvard 
Bureau of Business Research Bulletin, 166 (1963), 16. 
Variety All General All Variety/General Variety (real Variety, real growth
Stores Merchandise
a
Stores Merchandise values)
b
since 1929 (%)
Number of stores
1929 12,110   54,636.00     1,476,365   22.16 N/A 0.00
1935 11,741   44,651.00     1,587,718   26.30 N/A -3.05
1939 16,946   50,267.00     1,770,355   33.71 N/A 39.93
Sales ($,000)
1929 904,147 6,444,101.00 48,329,652 14.03 800,130       0.00
1935 780,819 4,619,751.00 32,791,212 16.90 813,353       1.65
1939 976,801 5,665,007.00 42,041,790 17.24 976,801       22.08
No. of employees
1929 159,715 814,937.00    4,286,516   19.60 N/A 0.00
1935 171,375 729,195.00    3,898,258   23.50 N/A 7.30
1939 211,766 867,007.00    4,600,217   24.42 N/A 32.59
Total pay roll
1929 95,362   818,930.00    5,044,128   11.64 84,391        0.00
1935 91,295   608,817.00    3,568,167   15.00 95,099        12.69
1939 121,804 803,485.00    4,529,499   15.16 121,804       44.33
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Table 2: Operating results for variety chains classified by average sale, 1933-35. 
 
Sources: McNair, “Expenses and Profits of Variety Chains in 1933,” 19-20; Teele, `Expenses and Profits of Limited Price Variety Chains in 1934,” 32-3; S.F. Teele, 
`Expenses and profits of limited price variety chains in 1935,’ Harvard Bureau of Business Research Bulletin. 103 (1936), 15-16.     
      
Notes: All cost and margin data are shown as a percentage of net sales.
 a
 Figures on this item were not reported by all firms in all years; 
b
 Net of cost of merchandise, plus 
freight, express, postage and truckage; 
c
 On fixtures and equipment; 
d
 Insurance (except on real estate); taxes (except on real estate or income);  travelling; and miscellaneous; 
e
 Because of inadequate balance sheet data for a few chains, the net gain figure for 5-25c retailers  is not comprehensive. 
1933 1934 1935
Items 5-25c $1 (low avg.) $1 (high avg.) 5-25c $1 (low avg.) $1 (high avg.) 5-25c $1 (low avg.) $1 (high avg.)
Average sale (cents) 16 20 30 17 23 29 17.5 24 30
No. of chains 5 5 11 5 8 10 4 6 11
Net sales ($,000) 441,502 39,458           167,433          483,051 50,786           186,573          484,332 56,396           198,770          
Average sales per store ($)
a
149,156 115,711       116,929        162,316 117,018       130,506        161,443 129,647       136,706        
Gross margin
b
38.78 36.59 33.99 38.33 36.47 32.81 37.97 35.83 32.22
Salaries and wages 15.47 14.68 13.48 15.98 15.43 13.73 16.00 15.05 13.50
Tenancy costs 11.63 10.38 9.67 10.81 8.56 8.84 10.88 8.26 8.47
Light, water, power 0.98 1.07 1.18 0.91 0.94 1.12 0.95 0.94 1.11
Depreciation
c
0.81 0.76 0.85 0.72 0.68 0.74 0.63 0.64 0.75
Supplies 1.13 1.23 0.93 1.07 0.90 0.98 1.14 0.81 1.03
Advertising 0.01 0.19 0.59 0.00 0.35 0.56 0.00 0.46 0.58
Other expenses
d
1.39 2.84 2.54 1.38 2.53 2.45 1.37 2.57 2.38
Total expenses before interest 31.42 31.15 29.24 30.87 29.39 28.42 30.97 28.73 27.82
Total expense including interest 33.39 33.02 30.78 32.76 31.11 29.91 32.92 30.40 29.30
Net profit/loss 5.39 3.57 3.21 5.57 5.36 2.90 5.05 5.43 2.92
Total net other income 4.05 2.28 1.91 3.47 1.90 2.11 3.64 1.90 2.26
Net gain before income taxes:
   Percentage of net sales 9.44 5.85 5.12 9.04 7.26 5.01 8.69 7.33 5.18
   Percentage of net worth
e
14.64 17.75 15.06 14.69 22.96 15.58 13.73 22.49 15.81
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Table 3: Operating results for the five main variety store chains, 1933 and 1934 
 
Sources: Baker Library, Harvard, Harvard Bureau of Business Research, , Arch E75.A15, Case 2, Variety chain studies, 1933 and 1934 files, undated worksheets. 
Notes: Class A = price range 5c - 25c, low average sale; B = up to $1, low average sale; C = up to $1, high average sale. Kresge was presumably classified in Class A owing 
to the dominance of its 25c stores in its overall business at that time.  
 
Name Class Average 
transaction ($)
Gross 
Margin
Pay Roll Rent Total 
Expenses
Net 
Margin
Stock 
Turn 
Net sales ($) Sales growth 
from 1929 (%)
Net sales per 
store ($)
1933
Woolworths A 16.0 40.30 16.43 12.78 33.51 6.79 4.74 251,163,459 -17.3 129,399       
S.S. Kresge A 18.0 38.82 14.91 11.85 34.21 4.61 4.99 125,973,000 -18.8 178,612       
W.T. Grant C n.a. 32.96 12.18 9.91 29.59 3.37 6.10 79,073,136   20.0 173,406       
Kress A 17.0 33.05 12.63 7.07 27.67 5.38 3.95 65,018,000   -5.0 282,687       
G.C. Murphy B 20.0 37.12 15.43 9.40 32.45 4.67 21,844,872   38.9 122,724       
1934
Woolworths A 16.5 39.98 16.96 11.85 33.92 6.06 250,517,000 -10.7 128,536       
S.S. Kresge A 19.0 38.49 15.44 10.89 33.77 4.72 4.48 131,682,376 -15.1 193,651       
W.T. Grant C n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.89 85,069,612   29.1 184,934       
Kress A 16.6 32.24 13.17 6.45 26.57 5.67 4.05 75,152,677   9.8 325,336       
G.C. Murphy B 23.0 36.08 15.70 7.73 30.29 5.79 4.21 27,955,481   77.8 153,602       
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for 16 Variety Store Chains (1929 and 1931- 34) 
 
 
Notes: Table shows full period means. 
 
Table 5 Determinants of Variety Store Net Margins (N=61) 
 
Notes: 1. Class A relates to variety stores in the 5c to 25c price range (with a low average sale price); Class B 
equates to the price range below $1 (with a low average sale price); Class C equates to the price range below $1 
(with a high average sale price); 2. Robust t-statistics reported.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Harvard id Store Name City State Net margin Price Net Sales Store size
(Head Quarters) (Head Quarters) (%) Class (mns) (000s)
3 M H King Co. Burley Idaho 2.10 B 0.22 35.06
6 Perry Bros. Inc. Howell Michigan 0.63 B 1.60 27.58
13 Rose's 5c-10c-25c Stores Henerson North Carolina 2.38 A 2.10 36.68
16 Scott Stores Chicago Illinois -8.46 A 4.30 53.11
18 S.H. Kress & Co New York New York 4.74 A 68.00 315.81
22 Autenreith's Dollar Stores Pittsburgh Pensylvania 1.41 C 1.20 56.06
27 G.C. Murphy Co. McKeesport Pensylvania 3.50 B 21.00 121.26
34 Schulte United, Inc. Chicago Illinois 2.04 B 0.91 25.16
42 People's 5-10-15c to $1 Stores, Ltd Montreal Quebec -0.44 C 1.70 60.15
45 Neisner Bros. Inc. Rochester New York 2.23 B 15.00 220.86
46 McLellan Store Co. New York New York 0.88 C 21.00 83.46
56 M.H. Fishman Co. Inc. New York New York 4.62 C 2.70 95.69
59 Walbert Stores Co. Ltd. Oklahoma City Oklahoma -15.85 B 0.10 16.10
66 S.S. Kresge Co. Detroit Michigan 3.95 A 140.00 209.67
69 W.T. Grant New York New York 2.53 C 76.00 200.84
79 F.W. Woolworth Co New York New York 6.29 A 250.00 129.43
Average 0.78 37.86 105.43
Coefficent t-stat Coefficent t-stat Coefficent t-stat
Price	bands Class	B -6.02 (2.81) *** -9.71 (3.10) *** -8.02 (1.90) *
(Ref.	Class	A) Class	C -6.79 (2.70) *** -14.04 (4.40) *** -12.85 (4.90) ***
Services	Costs %	of	Payroll -1.81 (2.41) ** -1.84 (2.65) ***
Firm	&	Store Sales	per	Store	(000s) 0.04 (2.77) **
Level	Economies Net	Sales	(millions) -0.04 (0.73)
Controls Firm	Effects YES YES YES
Year	Effects YES YES YES
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Figure 1: The service cost - unit value continuum for multi-product retailers with a 
broad product range in the 1930s 
 
 
Notes: For a discussion of low, medium, and high grade department stores, see Peter Scott 
and James Walker, “Sales and advertising expenditure for interwar American department 
stores,” Journal of Economic History, 71 (2011), 32-60. 
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